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In the Supreme Court 
of tl1e State of Utah 
ROBER1, P. vVOOLLEY. 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
• 
VS. Cnsc No. 8046 
rvllL'TC):\ S. \V'r.COFF. 
De/enrlanl and Appellant 
I~RIEF OF DEFENDANT /\NO /\PI_)l~IJ~ANrf 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was brought by \Voolley, respondent, a ·li-
censed real estate broker ( R-22) for a real estate commission 
for services under an alleged oral contract to find a tenant for 
a ten-year lease (R-12), for approx1mately 10,000 square 
feet of space in a warehouse building located at approximate-
ly 1550 South 2nd \\lest. Salt Lake City, Utah. This prop-
erty included a large \varehouse. Wycoff. defendant and ap-
pellant. was interestated in purchasing this particular real 
property, but only if he could find a tenant (R-135) to lease 
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the front portion of the warehouse ( R- 13 7) at the rate of 
4c per square foot on a ten-year lease. 
Wycoff n<'vcr 1 )Urchased this 2nd West property, al~ 
though he ffiitdt· an offer to purchase it on August 8, 1951, 
( R-124). l--Ie si~1 l(•cl a standard earnest money receipt agree-
ment and paid $ 1 ,000 earr}('sl money to a local real estate 
company not herein involved (R-124). After it was ac-
n·pt<'d. but before he discovered that his offeree did not 
have good title ( R- 1 =s l . he proceeded with tentative plans 
to utilize the property. 
Woolley, although a licensed real estate broker, is not· 
a member of the Salt Lake f(eul Estate Board (R-131 ). 
Cheney, a mutual friend of both \ \fycoff and plaintiff had 
interested Wycoff in a business venture involving processing~ 
\Var surplus materials \vhich would require the use of part 
of a larPe \varchouse such as that located on South 2nd , ... 
\Vest (R-144). Cheney discovered that plaintiff Woolley 
had a client who was seeking approximately- 10,000 square 
~'•'P! of \varchouse space (R-135). Cheney introduced 
Woolley to Wycoff (R-2). There is a conflict as to 
\\rhether this meeting occurred and as to what was said, if 
anything. but there. is-agreement that this particular alleged 
conversation is the only basis for the oral employment con-
tract under· which Woolley recovered a $2,099.80 judg- . 
ment in the lo"'er court for a real estate commission. 
Woolley's own account of this converstation which 
he claims formed the contract is as follo\VS: 
" (Woolley) * * * About that time Mr. Cheney 
spoke up and said, 'If Woolley can find a tenant for 
this building,' which could have been, . 'ho\v will he 
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corne out on the deal?' 
.. *** 
.. ~~\. 0 lr. Chene\· s;.lid. "lfo,, \viii he collH' oul~ 
ho\\' ·\\·ill \\ 'oolley ~o1ne out·. 0lr. \ \' ~·col'f saiJ. 'I 
,,.ill pa v i' lr. \ \' oollev the lea~inQ· con1rni~~ion if he can 
find a. tenant'. and .I said. .rrh~t is fine ,,·ith me·." 
(R-27) 
On cross exan1ination \\ 'oollcy · s testiinony concerning 
this conversation \'.l:~ ttS follo\vs: · 
''Q. (~Ir. Ourhan1) Is it true !VIr. Wycoff said, 
'I \Yant a tenant if I purchase this 2nd \Vest property'? 
A. No, he said, ' \viii buy the property if I can 
find a tenant--if you can find a tenant'. I am very cer-
tain he did not say there was any question as to 
\vhether he would buy the building, but if he found a 
tenant. he would buy,_.,if I found a tenant· he would 
buy the butlding. ( R-46). 
Cheney, the only witness to the alleged converstation 
testified as Woolley's vvitness. His account of this conver-
sation after a fifteen day recess ( R-130, 131) was as follo\vs: 
''A. I am trying to think ho-,v the conversation 
sturted out. l introduced Mr. \Voolley and reminded.-
told Mr. Wycoff again he was a real estate broker, 
and that he was the man who had a lessee who 
might be interested in looking at this property, and l 
said to \Vycoff. 'Now where is Woolley coming 
out on this' kind of prefacing the conversation, and 
\Vycoff said, 'We will take care of him' and Woolley 
said, 'That is all right \vith me', so I let the whole thing 
drop. 
5 
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''I assumed they had come to some agreement 
and knew 'vvhat they were talking about, at that point. 
Q. Was there any discussion at that time as to 
the terms that Mr. Wycoff wanted Mr. Woolley to 
obtain out of a tenant? Or the size? 
A. All I remember \vas $400 , a month, or 4c a 
foot. That is about what--I think it ·was 10,000 feet. 
They v-.ranted 4c a foot. 
Q. And the conversation \Vus this building on 
South 2nd \Vest as 1554, was it referred to; in other 
words, you were talking about this building, about 
this space in the building 7 
A. That's rtght." (R135, 136). 
On cross examination, Cheney repeated what 
occurred: · 
Q. (By l\1r. Durham) Mr. Cheney, \vas there. 
any discussion with Mr. Woolley and Mr. Wycoff 
this first meeting, as to specifically any commission; 
\\'as the word 'commission' used there 7 
A. Not that I rember. 
Q. Now would you repeat again the exact \vords 
as you recall them concerning vvhere Mr. \Voolley was 
going to come out on this? 
A. 1.,hat is just about the way I put it. 
Q. To \Vycoff you stated that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. '\\'here is Woolley going to come out on 
this?' 
A. Yes. 
6 
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Q. l\ 1 r. \\ 'oolley clid not raise that qu('~tion 7 
i\. No. 
Q. i\Ir. \ \·'ycoff did not rai~c thnt question? 
~-\. No. 
Q. 1\nd then \vho \\'llS the next person to speak. 
after you said, '\\'here is \ Voolley coming out on 
this'? 
/\. \\1 ell Slim says. '\ \ 'c \\'ill t~ke care of him'. 
Q. By 'Slim' you mean l\Ir. \Vycoff? 
1\. That is right. \\.1 oolley said. 'That is good 
enou£th for me'. \\!hat they meant bv that, I didn't 
kno,,:~ I assumed thev had. as bctvv~en themselves, 
con1e to some agreem~nt. There \\·as no more discus-
sion that l rernembcr." ( R-140). 
\Vycoff denied that the foregoing conversations took 
place and denied that he ever said ''I \Nill pay the commis-
sion" ( R-93). He also denied ever discussing commission 
vvith Woolley ( R-118) in the presence of \\1 oolley or at 
nny other time (R-93) . 
. , 
Easton, the prospective tenant for the 1 0-year lease, 
advised \Vycoff he would take such a lease. This lease 
was never drafted or executed and Easton never paid Wy-
coff any money. Shortly before September 1, 1951, he 
started to move into the 2nd \Vest property ( R-59) without 
authority from Wycoff (R-120), and took approximately 
3,850 square feet more (R-27) than he orally promised 
to lease from \Vycoff for which he paid Fnedmans, the 
ov·:ners, $450 per month ( R-48). 
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Wycoff first determined that Friedman's title was en-
cumbered beyond their equity in the properly under the 
earnest money agreement after Friedman had accepted his 
offer ( R-15). He thereafter rescinded the tetl).porary agree-
ment and, after a trial on the merits, recovered judgment 
for his $1 ,000 earnest money ( R-15). 
\\tolley demanded his entire commission at the rate of 
5 percent of the first five years' rentals and 3 ·percent of the 
second five years' rentals, or $1,920 on September 20, 1951 
( R-36). even though under the terms of the oral 1 0-year 
lease agreement with Easton, Wycoff would have .received 
only $400 per n1onth for 10 years if he had purchased and 
leased the 2nd \Vest property ( R-52, 54). 
In the complaint Woolley .alleged that the action was · 
for money damages for breach of an oral contract ( R-1 ) . In 
\Vycoff's An1ended Answer (R-12) which was granted 
by order of the court ( R- 11 ) , \Vycoff denied the existence 
of the oral contracl and defended on the further grounds 
that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which re-
lief could be granted and .that the action was barred by the 
Statute of Frauds (R-12). 
On cross-examination \\1 oolley reaffirmed the oral na-
ture of the transaction: 
"Q. Isn't it true there is no writing of any kind 
behveen you a.nd Mr. Wycoff involving this transac-
tion? 
A. That is true." ( R-46). 
The rules of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board \vere in-
troduced into evidence'(R-76). The rules specified at page 
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5 thereof that the real estate conln1tsston shall be not lesS! 
thar-4 5 percent for the first five years: 3 percent for the next 
fiYc years: 2 percent beyond. Under Sub-division L. \vhich 
is under the said g·eneral heading, the follovving appears: 
'' ( L) \\'hen C ornmission Earned. A commis-
sion on a lease is earned and p'ayable when, through 
the ag·encey of the broker, the minds of lessor and les-
see have met on the terms of the lease as evidenced by 
a cash deposit or vvritten agreeinent.'' 
There is no conflict in the evidence that Easton never 
paid either a cash deposit or signed a written agreement with 
\\'ycoff. 
The trial court made the follo,ving Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law: 
"Findings of Fact" 
1. That at all times hereinafter mentioned plain-
tiff \Vas a real estate broker duly registered and li-
-censed by the Securities Commission of the State of 
Utah, pursuant to Chapter 61-2, U. C. A. 1953 
(formerly Section 82-2-2. lJ.C.A. 1943). 
2. That on or prior to i\ugust 1, 1951, the de-
fendant had entered into negotiations with Bessie E. 
Friedman and Western Salvage and Supply. Inc., a 
Utah corporation, for the purchase by defendant of 
certain improved real estate at 1550 South Second 
\\1 est street. Salt l_Jake City. Utah. 
3. That on or about the 1st day of August, 
1951, the defendant represented to plaintiff that he 
held an option from the said Bessie E. Friedman and 
\\'esem Salvage and Supply Company, Inc., by the 
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terms of which defendant 'had the right to purchase 
the said irnproved property and the defendant on or 
about the said 1st day of August, 1951, orally em-
ployed and engaged plaintiff to secure for defendant 
a tenant ready, able, and willing to lease from the 
defendant a specified portion of the sa"id premises 
for a period of 1 0 years and at a rental of $400.00 
per month and agreed that, in consideration thereof. 
defendant \vould pay to plaintiff the usual and cus-
tomary real estate broker's comrni ssion then prevailing 
in and about Salt Lake City, Utah. 
4. 1,hat thereafter and on or about the 15th day 
of August, 1951, plaintiff did procure and make avail-
able to defendant a tenant, to-wit, one A. A. Easton 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, who was then and there a 
person ready, willing, and able to lease and who did 
orally agree with defendant to lease the specified por-
tion of the saj.d property from defendant for a period 
of 10 years and at a rental of $400.00 per month. . 
5. That the usual and customary and also the 
fair and reasonable real estate broker's commission 
then and there prevailing in and about Salt Lake City 
for procuring a tenant ready and willing to lease on the 
landlord's terms· was and no\v is a sum equal to five 
percent of the rentals agreed upon for the first five 
years of the term of the lease and three percent of 
the rentals agreed upon for the next five years of the 
term of the lease. 
6. That the said defendant failed and refused 
to exercise his option to purchase the above described 
property and therefore failed and refused to enter into 
a lease agree1nent with the said i\. A. Easton on the 
terms aforesaid, or at all. 
7. That thereafter and on or prior to the 20th 
day of Septernber. 1951, plaintiff made demand up-
10 
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on defendant for the pa~'rncnt of the said sun1 of 
S 1. 920.000 for real estate brokeruge con1mission and 
that the defendant failed and refused to make pay-
ment thereof. or of any part of the same. 
8. That there is now due and ovving from de-
fendant to plaintiff as commission for plaintiff's serv-
ices as a real estate broker the sum of $1,920.00, to-
gether \\'ith interest thereon at the rate of six percent 
per annum froin the 20th day of September, 1951. 
From the foreging findings of fact the Court 
makes the follo\\'ing its conclusions of law: 
Conclusions of Law 
That plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against 
the defendant for the sum of $2,092.80 and for his 
costs of cour herein expended.'' ( R -166-8) . 
\Vycoff filed a0timely motion for a new trial (R-170) 
\vhich was denied by the court ( R--72) . V\rhereupon appeal 
was taken to this court ( R-17 4) . 
STATEMENTS OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THERE CAN BE NO RECOVERY BY A REAL ESTATE BROK-
ER UNDER AN ORAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT TO OBTAIN A 
TENANT BECAUSE "REAL ESTATE" AS USED IN THE STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS INCLUDES A TENANCY FOR YEA:ltS. 
POINT ll. 
THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH 
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. 
1 1 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
TliERE CAN BE NO RECOVERY BY A REAL ESTATE BROK· 
ER UNDER AN ORAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT TO OBTAIN A 
TENANT BECAUSE "ltEAL ESTATE" AS USED IN THE STATU'l'E 
OF FRAUDS INCLUDES A TENANCY FOR YEARS. 
There is but one question in this case: Does the term 
~·real estate" contained in the Statute of Frauds (Sec. 25-5-4 
( 5) U.C.A. 1953,) include a ten-year lease? Sec. 25-5-4 
{5) U.C.A. 1953 (hereinafter re.frerred to as the 5th Sub-
diYisioi~ of the Statute of Frauds) reads as foHo'A'S: 
''In the following cases every . agreement shall 
be yoid unless such agreement, or some note or n1cm-
orandum thereof. is in writing subscribed by the pttrty 
to be charged therewith: 
" * * * 
'' { 5) Every agreement authorizing or employing 
an n~C'nt or broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation." 
l.,he general construction statute (hereinafter referred to 
as the general statute) specifically defines "real estate" to 
include such a tenancy at Sec. 68-3-12 ( 10) U.C.A. 1953, 
a~ follows: 
''In the construction of these statutes the follo\v-
ing rules shall be observed, unless such constn1clion 
\vould be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the 
legislature or repugnant to the context of the statute: 
" * * * 
" ( 10) The terms 'land,' 'real estate' and 'real 
property' include land, tenei~ents, heredituments, 
12 
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\Vater rig·hts. possessory righ Is and clain1s." ( l~rnphasis 
added.) 
That a tenancy for years is n ··possessory right'' is too 
apparent to require supporting legal authority. 
Under the decisions of this court it is clear that there can 
be no recovery for a real estate broker's services selling "real 
estate" \vhich· are not provided for by \Vritten agreement. 
Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1. 184 P.2d 335. ( 1947); Case 
v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243 188 P. 640 ( 1920). 
Nor can the operation of the Statute of Frauds here be 
nullified by the doctrine of part performance because that 
doctrine is "purely equitablev in nature ?-nd has no place in 
an action at law" Baugh v. Darley, supra, at 184 P.2d 337. 
Also the doctrine of equitable estoppel is inapplicable here 
because the plaintiff complains only of Wycoff's refusal to 
carry out the alleged promise to pay him a commission in the 
future, which promise in no way operated as an a~andon­
ment of an existing right by Wycoff as is requisite for an 
e~toppel. Ravarino v. Price ____________ Utah ____________ , --~-~-~----
P.2d _S_7~. case No. 7882. decided August, 1953; Papanik-
olas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404.274 P.856.(1929); Elliott u. 
Whitmore,- 23 Utah 342, 65 P.70 (1901). 
Therefore, if "real estate" in Sec. 25-5-4 ( 5) U.C.A. 
1953, includes a tenancy for years, the trial court erred in 
awarding plaintiff broker a judgn1ent for a commission. 
The general construction statute now contained in Sec. 
68-3-12 ( 10) U. C.A. 1953 has been in effect in Utah in its 
present form since statehood. l..,he same general definition, 
in a different form. antedated statehood. (See Sec. 2997(2), 
13 
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2 C.L. of Utah 1888. It w~s first expressed in its present 
form in Sec. 2498 ( 10) of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 
189~,. It is to be noted that the language of Subdivision 10 
is n t couched in permissive language. Unlike Subdivision 21 
u nd some of the other subdivisions of the same section, the 
\vords may mean are not employed. 'The legislature said sim-
ply, the term "real estate" includes possessory rights. Sub-
division 5 of the Statute of Frauds was enacted later than 
the general construction statute on March 11, 1909. (See 
LJtah Session Laws of 1.909, Page 119 and Compiled Lavvs 
of Utah, 1907, Section 2466. vvhtch contains only the first 
four subdivisions of the present 23-5-4 U. C.A. 1953). Thus 
there can be no question that the 5th Subdivision of the 
Statute of Frauds must be construed in hght of the general 
definition of "real estate." 
The purpose of general construction statutes is discussed 
in the 3rd edition of Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 
page 224, \T ol. II. Sec. 3003. as follovvs: 
''Practically all of the states enacted at an early 
date a general statute defining tem1s commonly used 
in legislative enactments. It must be presumed that all 
subsequent legislation is enacted in light of and 'Nith 
knowledge of these general interpretive statutes and 
thus the statutes control exceot where a clear legisla-
tive intent to substitute a different interpretatio~ ap-
pears'' * * * \Vhere general interpretive statutes exist 
these should be relied on extensively in determining· 
the meaning of particular \vords. The rules of in pari 
rnateria. adoption of prior statutes, and legislative con-
struction support the generous use of these statutes. 
It is to be regreted that so many cases have been de-
dded \vjthout apparent concern for the enlightening 
djrection of the general interpretive chapter of the 
14 
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code. In many codes it appears as the l'ir~l chnptcr and 
its very location bespeaks the ilnportnnce and g·erH'ral-
ity that the legislature. attached to it.'' 
Justice Thurman in s I ol (' Board () f Land c:-onlmissi~ners 
us. Ririe, 56 Utah 213, 190 P.59, 63, stales forcefully the rea-
son \vhy the general construction statute should be utilized in a 
case comparable to the pre~ent: 
''* * * it nevertheless stands as an unirnpeach-
able fact that the (general) statute is a positive rule of 
construction enacted as such by the legislature and 
must be given full force and effect. ( C yc. 11 OS, and 
Case cited). No statute or series of statutes in pari 
materia could by name possibly be more potent in de-
termining the meaning of a \vord or \vords used in a 
statute than is an act of the legislature itself enacted 
for that especial purpose.'' 
An examination of every reported Utah case which has 
cited the general construction statute from the beginning of 
the Utah Reports ( Se_c. 68-3- 12 U. C. A.; Sec. 88-2-12 
U. C. A. 1943; Sec.· 2498 C.L. of Utah 1907) as -re-
ported by Shephard's Utah Citations has been made and it 
indicates that this Court has consistently utilized the general 
construction statute's definffons in construing specific statutes 
unless such general definjtion was clearly inapplicable. 
1.,wo cases decided by this court involving Subdivision 4 
of the general construction statute, one using the general def-
inition and the other not, indicates that the general statute is 
applicable to define "writing" to include "printing" when 
a clear contrary legislative intent is not apparent from the 
specified statute under scrutiny. Pingree National Bank v. 
McFarland, 57 Utah 410 195 P.31 S ( 1921) (general con-
1.5 
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• 
' d f f ,, ,, I d ,, '' struction statute s e inition o · writing to inc u e printing 
applies to N.l.L.'s requirements of a "written" endorsement,) 
and First Savings Bank of Ogden v. Bramwell 67 Utah, 247 
P .5 73, ( 1926) ( sarr1e general definition does not apply to 
statute dealing with recording fees to include printed words 
when specific statute states fees are to be charged on "words 
nctuafly written in.") 
State Boord o/ Land Commissioners v. Ririe 56 Utah 
213, 190 P.59 ( 1920) considered whether the state land 
board had authority to invest state funds in the purchase of 
town bonds vvhen the specific statute authorized only that 
such funds ''shall be invested in * '* * city * * * bonds." 
fhe court utilized the provision noM/ contained in Subdivision 
21 of 68-3-12 lJ.C.A.-1953, which states that "the word 
'city' may mean incorporated town," to determine that town 
bonds were a legal investment. See also Chatwin v. Terry, 
107 Utah 340, 153 P.2d 941 ( 1944) which used Subdivision 
7 of the general Statute to determine that jurisdiction of the 
juvenile courts includes females under 21 ~Tears as well as 
n1nles \vhen the specific statute used only the word "he". The 
f ollo,ving cases also hold the ~2cncral construction statute's 
definitions applicable: 
Public Utility Commission v. ]ones, 54 Utah 111, 179 P.745 
( 1919): Pleasant \1 alley Coal Company v. Carbon County. 
81 Utah 13, 16 P.2d 712 ( 1932): Western Beverage 
Company o/ Prouo v. Hansen, ;98 lJtah 332, 96 P.2d 1105 
( 1939); Romney v. Lynch, 58 Utah 479, 199 P~974 ( 1921) 
McMilan v. Emery, 59 Utah 553, 205 P.898 ( 1922): La-
vagnino v. [_!hlig, 26 Utah 1, 71 P. 1046 ( _1903}: aff'd. 198 
l1. S. 443. 49 L. Ed. 1119. 
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As already indicated, the only cases \vhere the gencn~l 
statute has been held inapplicable ha\'e been as in the "writ-
ing" cases (supra) or \vhere there \\'uS an explicit or implicit 
statutory definition to the contrary contained in the specific 
statute involved in the follo\ving case~: Young u. Corless. 56 
Uah 564, 191 P. 647 ( 1920); and In re Lamont's Estate, 95 
Utah 219, 79 P.2d 649 ( 1938), All of these cases are dis-
tinguishable from the instant case. 
The evident purpose of the 5th Subdivision of the 
Statute of Frauds wns to require a real estate agent or broker 
to reduce any employment contract to writing.· Kratovil in 
Real Estate Law says: 
''Because of the endless litigation that · has 
arisen 8:S. to the existence of an emplownent contract, 
in many states (l\rizona, California, Idaho, Indiana, 
lo"va, Kentucky, Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon, 
Oklahoma, Ohio, Utah, \Vashington, Montana, 
Nebraska, and \Visconsin, for example) the contract 
of employment must be in writing in order for the 
broker to be entitled to a commissi.on. (Page 68, Pren~ 
tree-Hall, Inc. 8th -Printing, 1950). · 
(See 17 A.L.R. 89~-4 and 9 A.L.R.2d 7S1-3 for the haec 
verba provisions of the Statute of Frauds of other ·states similar 
to Sec. 25-5-4 ( 5) U.C.A. 1953.) It is apparent that Utah's 
statute was one of the earltest. All later enactments have 
been worded to avoid the problem whether a broker's employ~ 
ment contract to obtain a leasehold as well as a freehold in-
terest is within the statute. In every instance a leasehold in-
~erest is included within the prohibitions of the statute. 
There may be stronger reasons of public policy which re-
quire a writing under the 5th subdivision of our Statute of 
17 
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Frauds than under the other provisions of said statute. The 
provisions conccrnrn~· services to be performed within a year, 
and cases involvinf! recovery for a reasonable value of im-
provements based on oral agreement to purchase, for instance, 
have been contrasted with this provision in the following lang-
uage: 
''It is different with the statute on brokers' agree-
ments. It provides that any agreement for the per-
formance of service as real estate broker shall be void 
unless in \vriting. The statute is as applicable to con-
tracts implied in law as any other. In effect, it forbids 
any recovery for service in selling land which are not 
provided for by written agreement." (Baugh v. Dar-
ley, 112 lJtah 1; 184 P. 2d 335, 339). 
The annotation at 17 A.L.R. 891, at pages 894 and 895 
collects the cases which contain judicial explanations for this 
addition to the Statute of Frauds. T4e Nebraska Supreme 
Court's opinion in Barney v. Lasbury, 76 Neb. 701, 107 
;\J. \\1. 89 ( 1906), is illustrative of the policy behind such an 
addition to the statute, \vhich requires a broker's employment 
contract to be ~'ritten: 
''The reasons ,vhich impelled the legislature to 
pass that act are known to the courts and the profes-
sion generally. Innumerable suits were being instituted 
from time to time, by agents and brokers after the ovvn-
crs of land had sold the same, claiming a commission 
on the ground that they had been instrumental in se-
curing the purchaser; and in many cases owners of 
land vvere compelled to pay double con1mission on ac-
count of such claims. In order to prevent such disputes 
and protect property owners under just such casPs as 
thf' one \\'C are considering, the legislature passed the 
act.'' 
18 
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The unifom1 refusal of every jurisdiction to pennit a 
quantum meruit recovery by the broker vvho fails to reduce 
his employment contract to \\Titing, n1akes evident how strong 
this policy is. (See particularly ]-/ale u. Kreisel, ________ \\lis. 
--------· 215 N.\V. 0 2i7 ( 1927) \Yhich overrules Seifert u. -,_").. 
Dirk, 175 Wis.~. 184. N.\\'. n98 (1921) vvhich tempor-
arily permitted a quantun1 mentil recovery under a void oral 
contract ~ontrary to all other jurisdictions. Note the discus-
sion in the annotation follo\Vi
1
ng· 17 A.L.R. 885). 
The Utah cases are in harmony with this principle. 
\ Vatson v. Odell, 58 Utah 276, 198 P.77 2 and Case v. 
Ralph, 56 Utah 243. 188 P640 . 
.. 
In Stroble u. Teorl, ________ Tex. ________ , 221 S.W.2d 
556 ( 1949) the Texas Supreme Court reversed the decisions 
of the two lower courts under facts similar to the instant case. 
The Texas Statute of frauds uses only the words "real es-
lnte''. The Court held that the realtor's oral oontract to procure 
a tenancy for years was void because. such a tenancy was 
included in the term ''real estate''. 
The annotation at 103 A.L.R .. 833 has examined the 
cases dealing with the question whJther an interest created 
by lease is "real estate" within the n1eaning of the Statute of 
Frauds requiring a written employment contract. The Ohio 
and Mich~gan equivalent of the 5th Subdivision of the Statute 
of Frauds, unlike Utah's. contain the words, "an interest" or 
·'any interest in real estate'', and the Suprerne Courts of those 
states have held that a lease is included in such statutory 
language. Brenner v. Spiegle, 116 Ohio St. 631, 157 N.E. 
491 { 1927) and Hannan Real Estate Exch. u. Traub, 217 
Mich. 162, 185 N.W. 706 ( 1921). The California and 
Washington Statute of Frauds are more nearly similar to · 
19 
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Utah's in that they contain only the term "real estate". How-
ever, in examining the statutes of those two states, it is ap-
parent that all California and Washington decisions are to be 
distinguished beca usc of the effect of their particular general 
construction statutes. The Civil C oJe o/ C ali/ornia, (Hill-
yer-Lake, 1947, published by Bender-Moss Company), at 
page 3, Chapter 13, contains the applicable general construc-
tion statutory language: 
''Section 13. Words and phrases, how construed. 
\Vords and phrases are construed according to the con-
text and the approved usage of the language, but tech-
nical words and phrases, and such others as may have 
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, 
or are defined in the succeeding section, are to be 
construed accor~ing to such peculiar and appropriate 
rneoning or definition.'' (Emphasis added.) 
''Section 14. * * * The following words have in 
this code the signification attached to them in this sec-
tion. unless otherwise apparent from the contexT. 
"2. The words 'real propery' are co-extensive 
\Vith lands. te~Ah'ts, hereditaments." 
The legislative history at the above page reference indi-
cates that this California statute was first enacted in 1873. An 
examination of the \Vashington statute indicates. at Title 2. 
Chapter 1, Reminr1fon Revised Statutes o/ \Vashington. that 
a fevv words are defined as in our general statute, but that 
Washington has no general statutory definition of the \vords 
"rea I estate." 
Obviously~ California· and \Vashington cases must be 
distinguished from the instant case, and none of the cases fron1 
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other jurisdictions have considered general construction statu-
tory definition of "real estate'' as is involved here. In fact, none 
of the decisions examined by this \\Titer have construed a gen-
eral construction statute together \vith the Statute of Frauds. 
All decisions cited by defendant to the lower court have been 
examined and distinguished. It ,,·ould seem apparent that the 
effect of the definition of ''real estate,, contained in Section 
68-3-12 ( 10) has at least as g·reat an effect on our Statute 
of Frauds as does the use of the vvords "an interesf' or "any 
interest" in real estate in other jurisdictions vvhere the courts 
have always held that a te1m for years is included within· the 
mandate of the statute vvhich requires a real estate agent to 
have his employment contract in \vriting. 
Defendant agrees \vith Justice Thurman in State Board 
o/ Land Commissioners v. Ririe.. supra, at 190 P.63, as to · 
the burden of proof under our general construction statute: 
"As to that question the (general) statute· itself 
imposes the burden upon those vvho take the negative 
'' ' view. 
Hovvever. the defendant \vishes to declare that the con-
text of the Statute of Frauds contains no repugnancy when 
the· terms "real estate" and "real property" are defined by the 
language of the general construction statute. Plaintiff argued 
to the trial court that the legislature could not have intended 
lo permit an oral lease for one year or less and to deny a 
broker his c<mimission pn this very same lease. It is submitted 
that such a result vvould be squarely in line with the policy of 
our Statute of Frauds and \vould carry out the manifest intent 
of the legislature. 
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-POINT II. 
THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH 
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. 
For the reasons stated under Point I of the Argument, 
the court below erred in its judgment because the complaint 
stated this action to recover a real estate commission was based 
upon an oral contract vvhich is not a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial c~urt erred in entering judgment against Wy-
coff in favor of plaintiff real estate broker because "real 
estate'' as used in the 5th Subdivision of the Statute of 
Frauds (Sec. 25-5-4 ( 5) U. C.A. 1953) is defined by the 
general construction statute (Sec. 68-3- 12) ( 10) U. C.A. 
1953) to include a 10-year lease, and plaintiff cannot re-
cover for his services because they vvere not provided for by a 
written agreement of any kind. · 
WHEREFORE, l\1. S. \\lycoff. defendant and ap-
pellant, prays that the judgrnent of the lower court be re-
versed and the loY\'er court instructed to make new findings 
and conclusions con:'istent 'A'ith this court's opinion. 
Respectfully sumitted, 
KING. ANDERSON & DURHAM 
Attorneys /or Defendant 
and Appellant.' 
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